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Managerial Stock Ownership As A Corporate Control Device: 
                                                    When Is Enough, Enough? 
 
                                                                 Abstract 
    
It has long been accepted that managerial stock ownership, beyond some range of possible 
entrenchment, can be an effective means of aligning the interests of professional managers with 
those of a firm’s outside owners to the benefit of firm performance.  In this paper, we offer 
evidence on the effectiveness of managerial stock ownership as a corporate control device by 
analyzing the behavior of 81 thrift institutions operating over the six-year period, 1989-1994.  
Based on the estimation of stochastic cost and profit frontiers, as well as other performance 
measures, our results suggest that managerial stock ownership provides an effective corporate 
control device.  However, this device is only effective as managerial holdings surpass about 33% 
of outstanding shares for improvements in cost efficiency and about 40% for profit efficiency. 
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Managerial Stock Ownership As A Corporate Control Device: 
                When Is Enough, Enough? 
 
“Managers in a company must have autonomy and a big (financial) stake to stay keen.” 
                                     John Malone, TCI Chairman and CEO1 
“Shareholders don’t manage banks; boards and senior executives do.” 
         Thomas Theobald, Former Chairman Continental Bank Corporation2 
                                          
I.  Introduction 
       Faced with growing challenges from factors such as increased competition, regulatory 
reform, and technological change, firms in most industries have focused considerable new 
attention on the efficiency of their operations in the recent past.  This is particularly true for the 
banking industry that by the early 1990’s was characterized by considerable over-capacity and 
inefficiency.  In response, many banks and thrifts undertook major restructuring programs 
involving substantial layoffs, consolidation, and the implementation of new technology.  In 
addition, firms such as Banc One and the Travelers Group adopted policies explicitly requiring 
managers to hold significant stock ownership in the firm.  Many states have also instituted 
policies requiring minimum stock ownership for directors of banking institutions.  In each case, 
the expectation is that by directly tying the manager’s wealth to the performance of the firm, the 
manager becomes more likely to operate the firm in a value-maximizing way that is generally 
consistent with the desires of owners.   
                                                           
1 Cited in The Denver Post, February 18, 1999, C1 on approval date of TCI and AT&T merger. 
 
2 Tom Theobald, “For Better Banks, Risk Management’s Money,” The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1992, A14. 
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       Whether managerial ownership improves firm performance is an unresolved empirical 
question, however.  Amihud, Kamin, and Ronen (1983) and Amihud and Lev (1981) frame the 
issue well by stressing the distinction between managerialism and ownerism.  In an environment 
of managerialism, professional managers can be expected to operate the firm in their own 
interests, while ownerism exists when managers act in the interests of the firm’s external owners.  
Bridging this divergence of interests is commonly assumed to be possible through managerial 
stock ownership. That is, high enough levels of managerial stock ownership relative to managers’ 
personal wealth may align the interests of managers with those of external shareholders for 
value-maximizing behavior, converting an environment of managerialism into one of ownerism 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gorton and Rosen, 1995).   
       This should not be taken to suggest that stock ownership on the part of the manager, in and 
of itself, necessarily brings about the beneficial performance effects inherent in ownerism.  In 
fact, managerialism and its accompanying poor firm performance may be reinforced by modest 
levels of managerial holdings.  That is, at low levels of stock holdings, managers may become 
entrenched and use their ownership power, though limited, to prevent their ouster even as they 
pursue their own interests, at the expense of the value of the firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Demsetz 1983; and Williamson, 1963).  This entrenchment is likely to be further reinforced 
within so-called opaque firms such as banks and thrifts (Ross, 1989).  With confidentiality a 
necessity in banking, outside stockholders do not have access to many of the managers’ 
decisions.  Hence, with very limited risk of detection and punishment in such an environment, 
entrenched managers may be more likely to choose to pursue individual goals at the expense of 
firm value. 
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        Gorton and Rosen (1995) offer an explanation of entrenchment in banking from a slightly 
different perspective.  They point out that banking was a declining industry in the 1980’s with 
considerable over-capacity.  As the best and brightest often preferred to offer their services to the 
economy’s growing sectors, the industry tended to retain a relatively large share of  “bad 
managers.  Consequently, the existence of a declining industry, with its relatively large share of 
bad managers, creates a perfect environment for managerial complacency.3   
        From these arguments, it is clear that the divergence between managerialism and ownerism 
is contingent on the size of the ownership stake that managers have in a firm.  Up to a certain 
point, rising managerial ownership may have a detrimental effect on firm performance as 
managers become more entrenched and complacent (managerialism dominating).  Beyond this 
point, further increases in managerial ownership may be beneficial to the performance of the 
firm, with manager-owners striving to improve the efficiency and value of the firm (the 
emergence of ownerism). 
       These theoretical considerations provide a background for a test of a Beneficial Ownership 
Threshold hypothesis.  Under this hypothesis, managerial stock ownership and firm performance 
should be related in a curvilinear fashion.  At modest levels of managerial ownership, the 
relatively poor performance predicted by managerialism is expected while above some threshold 
level of managerial ownership, the superior performance of ownerism is anticipated.  We 
examine this hypothesis by first creating measures of firm-level profit and cost inefficiency for 
81 thrifts operating from 1989 to 1994, yielding a total of 486 observations.  Since thrifts, by 
                                                           
3 Such complacency is often associated with monopolies in the Hicksian sense whereby, without the threat of 
competition, managers become slack, enjoying the “quiet life,” by putting less effort into maximizing operating 
efficiency.  This managerial slack creates various social costs including a restriction of output relative to the 
competitive level, a misallocation of resources, and higher consumer prices.  In the case of managerialism, bad, 
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their nature, tend to produce homogenous products, predominantly home mortgage loans and 
mortgage securities, their relative profit and cost inefficiencies can be reliably calculated.  These 
inefficiency scores serve as our primary measures of firm performance.  In a separate step, we 
relate the profit and cost inefficiency scores to managerial stock ownership to directly test the 
hypothesis.  To consider the reliability of these tests, we also relate managerial stock holdings to 
alternative, accounting- and regulatory-based measures of firm performance and risk. 
       Our empirical results generally support the Beneficial Ownership Threshold hypothesis for 
thrifts. At levels of managerial stock ownership below about 33% for cost efficiency and 40% for 
profit efficiency, we find the negative relation between managerial holdings and firm 
performance predicted by managerialism.  As managerial stock ownership rises above these 
thresholds, the relation turns from negative to positive, suggestive of ownerism.  Interestingly, 
subsequent analysis of various risk measures indicates that firm risk may fall as managerial 
ownership rises above similar ownership levels. Taken together, the results suggest that 
managerial stock ownership may serve as an effective corporate control mechanism to reduce 
managerial agency costs for thrifts but only when managers control a relatively large share of the 
firm’s stock. 
       In the remaining paper, Section II provides a brief summary of previous studies examining 
the relation between ownership and firm performance.  Section III presents the empirical models 
and data used in the study.  Section IV contains the empirical results, and Section V provides 
conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
entrenched managers similarly may seek a “quiet life” in which they do not have to maximize operating efficiency 
and misallocate resources at the firm level (see Berger and Hannan 1998; Amihud and Lev 1981; Hicks 1935). 
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II.  Overview of  Previous Studies 
 Previous research includes relatively recent cost and/or profit efficiency studies which bear 
directly on the current paper and also studies on risk which, while only indirectly related, are 
important in the development of the current paper.  These are discussed in the following sections 
and are summarized in Table 1. 
      Relatively few studies have directly examined the relation between managerial stock 
ownership and firm efficiency using cost and profit functions because of both data constraints 
and the conditions necessary to make efficiency comparisons between firms.  With respect to 
data constraints, cost and profit function data are simply rarely available for all but firms of 
regulated industries.  On the latter point, as Berger and Hannan (1998) suggest, to effectively 
determine relative efficiency between firms, those firms must: 1) be part of the same industry, 2) 
have access to the same production technologies, and 3) produce relatively homogenous 
products.  The banking industry satisfies these constraints rather well and, thus, has served as the 
environment for a number of analyses of relative firm efficiency.4    
         Only five of these studies directly offer evidence on the relation between managerial stock 
ownership and bank efficiency.  Pi and Timme (1993) considered the effect of CEO ownership 
structure on the operating efficiency of a sample of very large bank holding companies (BHC’s) 
during the late 1980’s.  They find superior performance for banks with relatively high CEO 
managerial ownership, but only when the CEO is not also the chairman of the board.  Berger and 
Hannan (1998) include managerial ownership in 1988 as a potentially important control variable 
in a study examining the effect of market concentration on BHC performance in the 1980’s.  
                                                           
4See Berger and Mester (1997) for a discussion of the production function for depository institutions and a survey of 
articles examining bank and thrift cost efficiency.  
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Berger and Mester (1997) also examine determinants of cost and profit efficiency of BHCs 
between 1990 and 1995, as a minor portion of a larger study.  Based on 1988 managerial stock 
ownership levels, they do not find managerial stock ownership to be a significant determinant.  
More recent studies by De Young, Spong, and Sullivan (1998, 1999) examine the relation 
between ownership and profit efficiency for a random sample of small, closely held U.S. banks in 
the Tenth Federal Reserve District from 1991 to 1994.  For this sample of predominantly small 
banks, they find that as managerial stock ownership rises, profit efficiency improves.  However, 
at higher levels of ownership profit efficiency falls. 
       Other related studies focus more on the relation between managerial stock ownership and 
market risk measures.  Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (SST) (1990), Mullins (1991), Demsetz, 
Saidenberg and Strahan (1997), Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (1998), and Anderson and Fraser 
(2000) examine the relation between market risk measures and ownership.  SST and Mullins find 
a significant positive linear relation between ownership and risk for a sample of 38 large BHCs 
using data in the late 1970’s to mid-1980’s.  Demsetz, et al. find a similar, positive relation, but 
only for low charter banks in the early 1990’s.  In contrast, Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (1998) and 
Anderson and Fraser (2000) find a significant positive relation in the 1980’s, but a significant 
negative relation in the 1990’s.   Brewer and Saidenberg (1996) study the relation between 
market risk and managerial ownership for large, publicly-traded thrifts in the 1980’s.  They, 
however, find a nonlinear relation with a positive relation between managerial stock ownership 
and market risk measures at high levels of ownership and a negative relation at low levels of 
ownership. 
       Other studies using accounting data to avoid problems of low ownership levels for large 
publicly-traded firms also find significant relations between risk-taking and ownership.  
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Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1995, 1999) examining the relation between accounting 
risk measures and managerial ownership for thrifts in the 1980’s and early 1990’s find a 
nonlinear relation similar to that found by Brewer and Saidenberg.  Interestingly, they find that 
while the risk-taking of the 1980’s was relatively unprofitable, the risk-taking of the early 1990’s 
appeared to be profitably taken.  Gorton and Rosen (1995) examining BHCs in the 1980’s 
similarly observe a nonlinear relation consistent with a corporate control hypothesis.  They find 
lower credit risk and higher returns for BHCs with high levels of managerial ownership (above 
about 40%) with an entrenchment effect at lower ownership levels.  Somewhat consistent with 
Gorton and Rosen’s results, Byrd, Fraser, Lee, and Williams (2000) find a lower probability of 
failure for manager-owned thrifts in the 1980’s.  However, Sullivan and Spong (1998, 1999) 
examining small, closely held banks find evidence of higher risk for banks when hired managers 
have significant ownership stakes.  Hence, evidence generally supports a significant effect of 
ownership on bank/thrift risk-taking behavior, but whether this effect is salutary or deleterious to 
the firm is less clear.    
       While each of these papers at least indirectly considers the issue we address, each has 
shortcomings in this application.  First, when the focus is on large BHC’s and market risk 
measures, since risk is measured in terms of market volatility, closely held firms with thin trading 
must be excluded from the analysis (see Anderson and Fraser, 2000).  Thus, the analysis is 
necessarily limited to considering firms that are widely traded that often have very low levels and 
narrow ranges of managerial ownership.   Large BHCs often have low managerial stock 
ownership.  For example, in the sample used by Pi and Timme (1993), mean CEO holdings were 
about 1% of outstanding shares.  DeYoung, Spong and Sullivan (1998) and Sullivan and Spong 
(1998, 1999) overcome the problem of limited managerial ownership by restricting their sample 
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to very small banks.  However, since the average asset size for the banks they consider is only 
$50 million, the results should probably not be generalized to larger institutions.  While Berger 
and Hannan (1998), Berger and Mester (1997), and Gorton and Rosen (1995) use non-market 
data to analyze large samples of banks with a wide range of ownership across a number of years, 
they use data on managerial ownership for a single year, 1988.  The use of ownership data for 
only one year may be problematic given the enormous changes in ownership structure that took 
place during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
       Studies of thrifts offer a much broader range of ownership levels than do BHC’s or banks, 
regardless of how they are selected.  As such, the thrift market provides an appropriate 
environment in which to consider managerial ownership and firm performance relations.  
However, most previous studies analyze data from the 1980’s, a period of regulatory laxity, 
which may well have lead to distorted relations between managerial stock holdings and firm 
performance.  With a new regulatory environment and considerable restructuring in the bank and 
thrift industries, along with trends for mandatory managerial ownership, such relations may be 
quite different today.  Studies of thrifts have focused on the relation between ownership and thrift 
risk taking using measures of ex-post market risk or financial performance.  These measures may 
be biased since they are affected by a number of exogenous forces or random events beyond 
management’s control.  In contrast, measures of controllable managerial operating inefficiency 
are less subject to exogenous factors, making them superior proxies for managerial behavior.  
This study adds to the previous literature by examining the relations between controllable 
managerial operating cost and profit inefficiency and managerial ownership for thrifts, which 
have not been previously examined.   
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III.  Empirical Model and Data 
       To identify the relation, if any, between managerial stock ownership and controllable 
managerial operating inefficiency and, in a subsequent analysis, firm financial performance and 
risk, we estimate equations of the form: 
                                        Yi = f (INSIDEi, INSIDESQi , Xi ) + ∈i                                  (1) 
 
where INSIDE is the fraction of stock owned by managers and directors of  thrift i; INSIDESQ  is 
the square of INSIDE and allows for the identification of a curvilinear relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance; X represents a vector of other factors that are likely 
to influence thrift performance; ∈  is a mean-zero error term; and Y is one of several respective 
measures of thrift i’s  controllable operating inefficiency, financial performance, or risk.  Our 
primary focus is on the relative controllable operating cost and profit inefficiency of thrift 
operations.  As such, inefficiency scores for each thrift are calculated from stochastic frontiers, as 
detailed below.  In an alternative regression, we use ROA (return on assets) as a measure of a 
firm’s financial performance.  To examine relations between ownership and risk, we also include 
CAPRATIO (a firm’s tangible equity to capital ratio) and PEER  ( a firm’s Sheshunoff regional 
risk ranking by similar to a regulatory camel ranking combining capital, asset quality, 
management, earnings, and liquidity).     
 
A.  Inefficiency Measures  
        We employ measures of both cost and profit inefficiency resulting from the estimation of 
stochastic frontiers (see Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen and Broeck, 1977;  Berger 
and Mester, 1997; and Rogers 1998).  The stochastic cost-frontier methodology incorporates a 
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two-component error structure.  One component represents random, uncontrollable factors, and 
the other represents individual-firm deviation from the efficient frontier caused by factors within 
a manager’s control, such as technical allocative efficiency.  By estimating the ratio of the 
variability of these factors, overall measures of controllable thrift cost and profit inefficiency can 
be calculated.  Hence, inefficiency measures exclude exogenous, uncontrollable factors that 
managers have little control over.  The frontier used to calculate these measures are described in 
more detail in the following sections. 
 
     1.  Cost Efficiency Frontier 
      As noted by Rogers (1998), the frontier, from a cost perspective, can be expressed in simple 
terms as: 
                              C  = f (y, w, uc, vc)                                                      (2) 
where C represents variable costs; y is a vector of quantities of variable outputs; w is a vector of 
variable input prices; uc is a measure of cost inefficiency; and vc denotes random error.                          
       Given the estimate of predicted cost for thrift i, the cost inefficiency score for that thrift is 
calculated as:                
                      CINEFFi = 1 -  [Cmin /Ci ] = 1 – [ ucmin / uci ]                                         (3) 
 
where Cmin  is the minimum value of  C for all thrifts in the sample.  A CINEFF value of  0.10 for 
a particular firm means that this firm produces its output at roughly 10% greater cost than would 
its most efficient counterpart.  As Rogers (1998) points out, cost inefficiency estimates include 
both inefficiency on the technical side, using too many inputs to produce y, and inefficiency on 
the allocative side, using suboptimal proportions of each of the inputs and outputs given 
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prevailing market prices.  Hence a CINEFF of .15, for example, would indicate that a firm is 
producing its outputs at a cost that is about 15% greater than the best practice firm. 
 
     2.  Profit Efficiency Frontier 
       Profit inefficiency estimation utilizes information on both the cost and revenue sides of the 
firm’s operations but is otherwise mechanically similar to cost inefficiency.  That is, the best-
practice firms are identified—those with greatest variable profit for a given set of variable input 
prices and outputs.  Then, all other firms in the sample are compared to these best-practice firms.  
Profit inefficiency is thus identified as a particular firm’s deviation from the maximum possible 
profit of the best-practice firms. 
      Under conditions of substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of services produced 
and where it is often impossible to compute prices of nontraditional output, which is generally 
the case in banking, Berger and Mester (1997) suggest that the appropriate approach to 
estimating the profit model is the alternative profit frontier.  While a standard profit frontier 
relates bank profits to both input and output prices, under the alternative profit frontier, output 
prices are taken as exogenous.  Hence, efficiency is measured by how close a bank comes to 
earning maximum profit given its output levels rather than its output prices.5 
       The alternative profit function can be used as follows: 
                                                           
5 The alternative profit efficiency frontier, as pointed out by Berger and Mester (1997, p. 901) and Rogers (1998), is 
helpful when some of the assumptions underlying cost and standard profit efficiency are not met.  Rather than 
measuring deviations from optimal output as inefficiency as in the standard profit function, variable output is held 
constant as in the cost function, while output prices are free to vary and affect profits.  Berger and Mester (1997) 
point out that the alternative profit function should be used when one or more of the following conditions hold: (1) 
there are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services; (2) outputs are not completely 
variable, so that a bank cannot achieve every output scale and product mix; (3) output markets are not perfectly 
competitive, so that banks have some market power over the prices they charge, and (4) output prices are not 
accurately measured. 
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                                        Π =   Π (y, w, un, vs)                                               (4) 
 
where Π is a thrift’s variable profit, un is a measure of profit inefficiency, and vs denotes random 
error.  The most efficient thrift will have the maximum value of un.  The alternative profit 
function utilizes the same output and input quantities as in the cost function of equation (2) but 
variable profit serves as the dependent variable instead of variable cost.  Based on the estimates 
of  Π, the profit inefficiency score for thrift i is computed as: 
 
                          PINEFFi  =  1  -  [ Πi /  Π max]  =  1 – [ui / uΠmax]                       (5) 
 
where Π max is the maximum value of  Π for all thrifts in the sample.  As with CINEFF, 
a PINEFF value of 0.10 would indicate that the thrift is sacrificing about 10% of potential profit.  
As pointed out by Berger and Mester (1997, p. 900), unlike cost efficiency, profit efficiency can 
be negative, whereby a thrift could “throw away more than 100%” of its potential profit.  Hence a 
profit inefficiency score can be greater than 100%.  They also note that a profit efficiency concept 
can be superior to cost efficiency for reviewing a firm’s overall performance since the former 
accounts for inefficiency on the output as well as the input side.  Profit efficiency is based on a 
goal of profit maximization requiring equal managerial attention to the creation of a marginal 
dollar of revenue as to the elimination of a marginal dollar of costs. 
 
B. Econometric Modeling of Inefficiency 
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     We employ a standard stochastic frontier methodology based on  multiproduct translog cost 
and profit functions to calculate inefficiency scores for the thrifts in our sample.6  These scores in 
turn are used as the dependent variables in cross-sectional regressions to examine the relations 
between managerial stock ownership and cost and profit inefficiency. 
 
     1.  Multiproduct Cost Function 
     As noted above, the cost and alternative profit frontiers use different dependent variables, 
respectively variable cost and variable profit, but employ the same set of exogenous variables: 
input prices and output quantities. Using Berger and Mester’s (1997) approach, cost efficiency is 
derived from a cost function in which variable costs depend on the prices of variable inputs, the 
quantities of variable outputs in addition to fixed inputs, random error, and efficiency.  Under the 
assumption that the inefficiency factors and random error terms are multiplicatively separable, 
equations (2) and (4) can be represented in natural logs as: 
                
                                      ln Z = f (y, w, z) + ln uz + ln vz                                             (6) 
 
where Z equals C, variable costs (interest and personnel expenses); and Π, variable profits 
(interest and fee income earned minus variable costs), for the profit frontier. The term y is a 
vector of variable outputs; w, a vector of prices of variable inputs, and z are quantities of any 
fixed inputs included to account for their effects on variable costs since they may be substitutable 
                                                           
6 See Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977),  Meeusen and Broeck (1977), Jondrow et al (1982) for a description of this 
methodology and, for more recent applications, see Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993), Berger 
and Mester (1997) and Rogers (1998).   
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or complementary with variable inputs.  The terms uz  and vz are, respectively, inefficiency and 
random error terms for each model. 
      To estimate the error term in equation (6) and in turn calculate each firm’s cost inefficiency 
and profit inefficiency index, we estimate the following popular translog specification 
(suppressing individual thrift subscripts): 7 
                  5                               2                                          5          5                                                 2          2 
ln Z = α + ∑j=1 Bj ln yj + ∑k=1 γk  ln wk + ½ ∑j=1 ∑l=1 Bjl ln yj ln yl + ½ ∑k=1 ∑l=1 γkl ln wk lnwl 
                             
               5          2 
           + ∑j=1 ∑k=1 δjk ln yj  ln wk  + ln z k+ ln uz + ln vz,                                                                    (7) 
 
where Z represents, alternately, variable cost or variable profit, depending on which frontier is 
estimated. 
       In this estimation, five outputs, yj, are used:  (1) 1-4 family mortgage loans and mortgage-
backed securities, (2) multifamily and nonresidential mortgage loans, (3) nonmortgage loans 
including consumer and commercial loans and lease financing, (4) cash and other security 
investments including U.S. government and agency securities, municipals, and other securities, 
and (5) construction and land loans, and real estate and service-corporation investment.  The 
prices of two variable inputs, wk, are used: (1) labor and (2) deposits and other borrowings. We 
measure the price of labor as total expenditures on employees divided by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees at the end of the year. The price of deposits is total interest expense 
divided by total deposits and other borrowings.  Two fixed input quantities z, as used by Berger 
                                                           
7For greater precision in calculating efficiency scores, Berger and Mester (1997) suggest the use of a Fourier-flexible 
function form, which is less restrictive than a translog cost function.  However, the translog form is easier to use, and 
for ranking decisions, studies demonstrate that it provides similar rankings as other forms.  Typical of many panel 
data analyses, convergence problems left no option to the pooled time series, cross-sectional approach taken here. 
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and Mester (1997), are also included: the dollar value of physical capital (premises and other 
fixed assets) and the dollar value of financial equity capital.8 
 
C.  Primary Cross-Sectional Models 
        In the second stage of the estimation, we perform cross-sectional regressions as in equation 
(1) for the sample using respective models on controllable managerial operating cost and profit 
inefficiency.  The cross-sectional regression to be estimated is: 
 
INEFFi = β0 + β1 INSIDEi + β2 INSIDESQi + β3 OUTSIDEi + β4 LOGSIZEi 
                       + β5 UNEMPi + β6 MKBKi  + β7-12YEARi + εi                                               (8) 
where: 
INEFF = individual inefficiency score of a thrift, 
INSIDE = the percentage of equity held by managers and directors, 
INSIDESQ = the square of INSIDE, 
OUTSIDE = the percentage of equity held by institutional directors, 
LOGSIZE = the log of asset size of a thrift, 
UNEMP = a control variable for regional economic factors, 
MKBK = market to book value of equity, as a proxy for thrift charter value,  
YEAR = a set of 5, year-specific dummies, with 1989 as the reference, and  
ε = a random error term. 
                                                           
8These measures are similar to those used by Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993, 1998) and 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1993).  See Cebenoyan, Cooperman, Register, and Hudgins (1993, 1998) and 
Rogers (1998) for a more detailed discussion of this methodology which this section heavily draws from.  We use a 
financial intermediation approach, following the arguments of Sealey and Lindley (1977) to specify thrift inputs and 
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      In addition to INSIDE and INSIDESQ9 used to test the Beneficial Ownership Threshold 
hypothesis, OUTSIDE is included to control for effects of institutional ownership on firm 
inefficiency, since McConnell and Servaes (1990) and other studies find institutional investor 
ownership to have a significant effect on firm performance.  
      To control for size, regional economic conditions, and charter value that previous studies find 
at times to affect a thrift’s performance (see Cebenoyan, et. al., 1993, 1995, 1998; Demirguc-
Kunt, 1989; Brewer and Saidenberg, 1996 and Anderson and Fraser, 2000), we include 
LOGSIZE, UNEMP and MKBK.  LOGSIZE is the log of asset size in millions.  UNEMP is the 
unemployment rate for the home state.  MKBK is a proxy for thrift charter value, measured as the 
ratio of a thrift’s market to book value of equity.  Cebenoyan, et al. (1995, 1999), Brewer and 
Saidenberg (1996), and Anderson and Fraser (2000) find charter value to be negatively related to 
firm or market risk measures.  Berger and Humphrey (1991), among other studies, find asset size 
to be significantly related to firm efficiency.  Studies also find thrifts in states suffering economic 
distress tend to have relatively higher inefficiency scores (Cebenoyan, et al., 1993).      
       Finally, we include a set of five, year-specific dummies (YEAR) that capture trends in 
performance affecting all firms within the period relative to performance in 1989.  Should 
performance benefits exist for the restructuring, adaptation of new technology, or renewed 
regulatory vigor that all thrifts have experienced during the period, we would expect them to be 
reflected in these dummies.  Based on the work of Stroh (1997) which showed thrift cost 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
outputs in the cost function.  This method assumes a thrift uses physical capital, deposits, other borrowings and labor 
as inputs to produce earning assets.  Results of the frontier estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
 
9 To determine whether a model should include INSIDESQ, we use Lagrange multiplier tests (see Ramanathan, 
1992, p. 313).   
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efficiency to improve in the mid-1990’s, we do anticipate finding thrift performance improving 
across the six years studied.  
 
D.  Data 
       We collect financial ratios and PEER rating measures from Sheshunoff’s S&L Quarterly for 
each year, 1989 to 1994, published by Sheshunoff Information Services, Inc., Austin, Texas.  
Income and balance sheet data come from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) call 
reports, as recorded by Sheshunoff on its Ferguson and Company Analysis and Forecasting 
System CD for all U.S. stock-chartered thrifts.  Our ownership and market to book data is from 
The SNL Quarterly Thrift Digest, 1990 to 1995 (SNL Securities, Charlottesville, Virginia).  
Manager and director ownership are based on 13D, 13G, and F11 filings to the SEC, FDIC, or 
OTS by individuals currently holding more than 5% of an S&L’s common stock, supplemented 
by the beneficial ownership information disclosed in proxy filings.  Institutional ownership data 
are compiled from 13F filings.10  Unemployment rates are from various issues of the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Washington, D.C. 
      To avoid any bias associated with three-year limitations placed on managerial ownership for 
S&Ls converting to stock ownership after 1980,11 our sample encompasses the period 1989 to 
1994 for all thrifts with complete data for the entire period, meeting this requirement.  The 
                                                           
 
10 Since data on large non-institutional blockholders were not included in the data collected for outside ownership by 
SNL Securities, OUTSIDE excludes other large blockholders.  Most other papers use 5% blockholders.  
Consequently, our measure may underestimate the effect of large external shareholders on managerial operating 
inefficiencies. 
 
11 After 1980, regulations for conversions prevented an alignment of the interests of managers and stockholders for a 
three-year period by incorporating an anti-takeover rule in which any beneficial ownership by an individual could be 
no more than 10% for any class of equity security for three years following conversion.  Limits were also placed on 
 19
sample begins in 1989, a year of restored regulatory oversight under FIRREA. The sample ends 
in 1994, because of a large number of sample thrifts that merged with other thrifts and banks in 
1995 and since.  Given these restrictions, our sample includes 81 thrifts operating for the six 
continuous years, encompassing 486 observations. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
A.  Descriptive Statistics 
      Descriptive statistics for selected variables used in estimating the cost and profit functions are 
shown in Table 2.  The average variable costs for the thrifts in the sample was $110.526 million 
and the average variable profit was about $55.744 million, representing an operating profit 
margin before taxes, extraordinary items and other fixed costs of about 33.5%.  Considering the 
means for different thrift outputs as a percentage of assets, about 68% of the typical thrift’s assets 
were in home mortgages or mortgage-backed securities.  This suggests that the majority of thrifts 
in the sample were traditional home lenders. The typical thrift had 12.3% of assets in multifamily 
and nonresidential mortgage loans, 9.43% in cash and other securities, 4.22% in nonmortgage 
loans, and 2.53% in construction, land, real estate, and service corporation investments.  The 
mean price of deposits and other borrowings was 6.08% and the mean employee salary $30,991.  
These means are similar to other thrift efficiency studies.  
      Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the primary cross-sectional 
regression models.  The mean cost inefficiency score for the sample, CINEFF, is 11.2%, 
indicating that the average thrift produces its outputs at a cost that is about 11% greater than the 
best practice firm in the sample. The mean profit inefficiency score, PINEFF, is 35.6% 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the amount of stock that could be offered during this period: a) to 5% for any person or identified group; and 2) to 
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suggesting that the average thrift is losing more than one-third of the profit it could be earning 
were it to produce and market its services as effectively as its best-practice counterparts.  These 
figures are within the observed ranges of existing cost and profit efficiency studies of banking 
institutions. The average for INSIDE is about 18%, and for OUTSIDE about 17%. Since many 
thrifts remain closely held, the range of ownership is wide, with a maximum of about 73% for 
INSIDE and 91% for OUTSIDE.  The mean for the market-to-book ratio, MKBK, is .84.  Prior to 
1991, thrifts had very low market to book ratios but with improved profitability in the 1990’s, 
these ratios averaged greater than one during the later part of the sample period.  UNEMP, the 
average state unemployment rate was about 6% over the period.  The mean asset size, SIZE, is $2 
billion, with the thrifts in the sample having a fairly large size, ranging from $68 million to $39.7 
billion. 
       The mean ROA (return on assets) is .53% over the period with a wide range from –6.33% to 
2.93%.  The mean for CAPRATIO (tangible equity capital to assets) is about 7.30% ranging from 
about .30% to 21.33%. This wide range reflects both improved profitability and a higher capital 
requirement for thrifts after 1990.  The average for PEER is 54.  PEER ranges from 0 to 99, with 
higher rankings indicating greater safety. 
 
B.  Cross-Sectional Results on Cost Inefficiency 
      Regression results, throughout the paper, use White’s (1980) consistent variance-covariance 
estimation procedure to adjust for heteroscedasticity.   The first panel of Table 4 presents the 
regression results using cost inefficiency as the dependent variable.  The significant Wald chi-
square indicates a relatively good fit for the model.  The coefficient on INSIDE is significant and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15-25% for all officers and directors (see Cordell, MacDonald, and Wohar, 1992). 
 21
positive while the coefficient on INSIDESQ is significant and negative, both at .01 significance 
levels.  These outcomes suggest that as managerial ownership rises initially, so does cost 
inefficiency.  Above a threshold of about 33%, further increases in managerial ownership become 
associated with falling cost inefficiency.12  
        OUTSIDE is not significantly related to cost inefficiency, supporting the suggestions by 
Ross (1989), Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), and Gorton and Rosen (1995), that outside owners 
have little effect on managerial performance in banking possibly as a result of the often cited 
information asymmetries in the industry. 
        Interestingly, the dummy variables for the different years strongly support the contention 
that the thrift industry, on average, significantly improved its cost inefficiency performance 
during the period.  Specifically, in each year beyond 1989, the coefficient on the year-dummies 
increase in size and, following 1991 (YEAR3) become significantly negative.  This is a clearly 
hopeful sign for an industry that performed so poorly during the 1980’s. The coefficient on 
LOGSIZE is significant and positive indicating greater cost inefficiency for larger thrifts in 
contrast to Berger and Mester’s (1997) finding of no relationship for their sample of banks in the 
1990’s.  The coefficient on UNEMP is also significant and positive, consistent with Cebenoyan, 
Cooperman, and Register’s (1993) finding of greater inefficiency for thrifts in economically 
distressed states.  
 
C.  Cross-Sectional Results on Profit Inefficiency 
     The second panel of Table 4 presents the regression results using profit inefficiency as the 
dependent variable.  The significant Wald chi-square again indicates a good fit for the model.  
                                                           
12 The turning point is calculated by solving for the unknown managerial ownership level at which the full effect is 
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Similar to the cost inefficiency model, the coefficient on INSIDE is significant and positive while 
the coefficient on INSIDESQ is significant and negative, both at a .05 level. The turning point on 
ownership is a bit higher to that for the cost inefficiency regression, about 40%.13  
       The coefficient on OUTSIDE is again insignificant, possibly suggesting information 
asymmetries in banking between external stockholders and managers.  For other control 
variables, the coefficient on LOGSIZE is significant and positive, indicating greater profit 
inefficiency for larger thrifts in the sample, consistent with Berger and Mester (1997) who 
interpret this result as indicating potential revenue-generating difficulties for banks as they get 
larger.    
      The coefficient on MKBK is significant and negative, indicating lower profit inefficiency for 
thrifts with higher charter values.  Higher charter value thrifts had lower profit inefficiency.  
Finally, as was the case for the cost inefficiency model, the YEAR dummies indicate that thrifts 
as a group experienced improving profit performance during the period—though the effect here 
does not seem to be as strong.  The YEAR dummies from the two models indicate that while 
thrifts experienced efficiency gains during the period, those gains seem to have been relatively 
concentrated on the cost side of operations.  Given that managers have greater control over 
internal operations than over market conditions, this outcome is as would be expected.14 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
equal to zero. 
 
13 Tests for multicollinearity between independent variables indicated no significant multicollinearity 
(see Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). 
 
14We also performed tests for other turning points on ownership using piecewise dummy variables (0 to 5%, 5 to 
20%, 25 to 30%, > 30%), as well as an alternative INSIDE3 variable.  Other than the >30% ownership dummy 
variable, these dummy variables and the INSIDE3 variable were insignificant.  In addition, we tested for outliers by 
removing individual firms with high levels of ownership from the sample.  The results were similar with the 
exclusion of these firms.  To test for a potential relation between size and ownership, we performed tests that 
indicated no significant multicollinearity between the two variables.  We also performed alternative regressions that 
included interaction variables between size and ownership.  The interaction coefficients were insignificant, and Wald 
chi-square tests indicated that they should not be included.   
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      Taken together with the results from the cost model, these results are very consistent with the 
Beneficial Ownership Threshold hypothesis, where modest levels of managerial ownership are 
likely to lead to the entrenchment of managers who have enough stock-voting power to prevent 
their ouster, but not enough to fully align their interests with the value-maximizing desires of 
outside owners.  Above the threshold, however, a clear alignment of interests between managers 
and stockholders in general occurs leading to value-maximizing behavior.  While the threshold 
levels of beneficial managerial stock ownership reported here might seem rather high, it should 
be noted that they are consistent with that reported by Gorton and Rosen (1995) who find 
evidence of entrenchment up to a managerial ownership level of about 40%.       
   
D.  Additional Cross-Sectional Regressions on Other Performance and Risk Measures  
 To help determine the reliability of the results presented above, we perform 
the additional cross-sectional regressions using an alternative, non-frontier based measures of  
performance, ROA, and risk measures, CAPRATIO and PEER.15     
       Table 5 shows the regression results for ROA.  In contrast to the regressions for CINEFF and 
PINEFF which had nonlinear relations on managerial ownership, Lagrange multiplier tests 
indicate a positive linear relationship between managerial ownership and ROA.  That is, as 
managerial ownership rises at any ownership level, financial performance improves. The result 
on ROA is similar to that observed by Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1999) using a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
15  We performed additional regressions on REO, real estate owned and REPOS, the percentage of repossessed assets 
held by thrifts.  For these regressions, managerial ownership variables were insignificant.  The results of these 
regressions are available from the authors.  
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different sample of thrifts in the 1990’s. The coefficient on OUTSIDE is significant and positive, 
indicating superior performance for thrifts with greater institutional investor ownership.   
       For other control variables, the coefficient on LOGSIZE was significant and negative.  As 
thrifts got larger over this period, they appear to have lower ROA’s.   Consistent with the 
previous regression on PINEFF, MKBK is significant and positive for both regressions indicating 
superior performance for higher charter value thrifts.  The time dummy variables were 
insignificant.  
       Table 6 shows the respective results for the cross-sectional regression on CAPRATIO and 
PEER.  Lagrange multiplier tests indicated that a significant nonlinear relation for the 
CAPRATIO regression.  For this regression, the coefficient on INSIDE is significant and 
negative, and the coefficient on INSIDESQ is significant and positive.  The turning point on the 
CAPRATIO for INSIDE is about 41%, a result completely in keeping with the turning point 
identified by Gorton and Rosen (1995) and the previous results for the PINEFF regression.  At 
low levels of managerial ownership, capital ratios fall, but at levels of ownership above about 
41%, capital ratios rise with managerial ownership.  Similar to the previous regressions, the 
coefficient on LOGSIZE is significant and negative indicating lower capital ratios for larger 
thrifts.  Also similar to the previous regressions, MKBK is significant and positive, indicating 
higher capital ratios for thrifts with higher charter values consistent with previous studies that 
find a negative relation between charter value and risk (Brewer and Saidenber, 1996; Cebenoyan, 
et al.,1999; and Anderson and Fraser, 2000).  
       For the PEER regression, Lagrange multiplier tests indicated that the relation between 
managerial ownership and PEER was linear and that INSIDESQ should be excluded as an 
independent variable.  The coefficient on INSIDE is significant and positive at a .10 level.  As 
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managerial stock ownership rises at whatever ownership level, PEER rises.  The coefficient on 
OUTSIDE is also positive and highly significant.  As institutional investor ownership rises, peer 
rankings rises.  Similar to the CAPRATIO regression, the coefficient on MKBK is also positive 
and significant. YEAR dummy variables are significant and negative for years 3, 4, 5, and 6.  
This may suggest greater thrift risk-taking reflected in lower peer ratings over time as the 
economy improved over the 1990’s, as suggested recently by regulators.  UNEMP was 
significant and negative indicating greater risk for thrifts in areas that were more economically 
distressed. 
       Thus, the results on CAPITAL are very consistent with the results on CINEFF and PINEFF 
with a similar turning point on managerial ownership for CAPRATIO, supporting the Beneficial 
Ownership Threshold hypothesis.  The results for the ROA and PEER regressions provide 
weaker evidence of a positive effect of managerial ownership on firm risk and financial 
performance at any ownership level.  CINEFF and PINEFF, as less ambiguous measures of 
controllable managerial operating inefficiency, appear to be more strongly affected by different 
levels of managerial ownership.  It is also interesting to note that while institutional investor 
ownership is significant for the regressions using published accounting/regulatory variables 
(PEER, CAPITAL and ROA), it is insignificant for the regressions based on internal measures of 
controllable managerial operating inefficiency (CINEFF and PINEFF), more opaque measures to 
outside investors. This supports the premise that external investors of financial institutions have 
little control over managerial behavior relative to manager owners.    
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
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       In this paper we present tests of a Beneficial Ownership Threshold hypothesis whereby 
managerial stock ownership is expected to be effective in aligning the interests of managers and 
owners, in general, for firm value maximization, but only above a threshold of managerial 
ownership.  Analyzing a sample of thrifts over the six-year period 1989 to 1994, we find strong 
support for this hypothesis.  The turning point occurs at a managerial stock ownership share of 
roughly 33% for cost and 40% for profit inefficiency. Below this level, it appears that 
managerial ownership leads to the entrenchment effect embodied in managerialism.  Above this 
level, increases in managerial holdings are significantly associated with improving firm 
performance as would be expected from ownerism.  Subsequent analysis of additional measures 
of thrift performance and risk generally support this conclusion.  
      Taken together, these results provide support for the proposition that recent mandates by 
banks/thrifts that managers and directors hold significant stock ownership stakes may be an 
effective agency cost control device, but only when total mandated ownership results in rather 
high levels of managerial ownership.  While the reasons for such a high threshold are not 
immediately obvious, productive avenues of inquiry might include assessing whether this 
outcome is tied to the generally declining nature of banking or informational asymmetries 
between investors and bank/thrift managers making these institutions less subject to external 
market discipline. That is, a rather lower threshold of beneficial managerial ownership might 
well be found in growing industries, with relative transparency to outsiders.  Another interesting 
finding concerns the apparent ability of institutional owners to positively impact a thrift’s 
financial performance but not its operating efficiency. This seems most likely due to the opaque 
nature of banking.  On a caveat, additional research is needed, particularly for the banking 
industry in the 1990’s to confirm these results.  Finally, the results should not be assumed to 
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necessarily hold for non-financial firms.   A fruitful area for future research would be to examine 
the effect of performance-based compensation programs on firm efficiency as well.  This issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.    
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Table 1: Summary of Previous Studies on the Effect of Managerial Stock Ownership on Banks and Thrifts 
 
Study (Date) Sample Results 
Cost & Profit Efficiency Studies 
Pi & Timme (1993) 
 
 
Large BHCs in the 1980s 
 
 
Cost efficiency improved with greater non-
chairman CEO ownership. 
Berger & Hannan (1998) 
Berger & Mester (1997) 
BHCs in the 1980’s 
BHCs in the 1980’s & 1990’s 
 
Cost & profit efficiency were unaffected by 
level of managerial ownership. 
DeYoung, Spong & Sullivan 
 (1998, 1999) 
 
 
Small, closely-held U.S. banks operating 
in the 10th Federal Reserve District in 1991 to 
1994 
Ownership by hired managers initially 
improves profit efficiency, but at higher levels 
profit efficiency falls. 
Risk-Taking Behavior Studies 
Saunders, Strock & Travlos (1990) 
 
 
Very large BHCs in 1978 to 1985 
 
 Positive linear relationship between 
ownership & market risk measures 
 
Mullins (1991)  BHCs in 1986 Positive linear relationship for large BHCs, 
but insignificant for a larger sample.  
 
Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan 
(1997) 
Sample of BHCs during 1991 to 1995 Positive linear relationship between ownership 
& risk but only for low charter value BHCs. 
Chen, Stein & Whyte (1998) Samples of large publicly-traded BHCs & thrifts 
in the 1990s 
 
The relationship between ownership & market 
risk is negative in the early 1990’s. 
Gorton & Rosen (1995) Sample of BHCs in the 1980’s using accounting 
data & a wide range of ownership 
At a turning point of about 40% inside 
ownership, BHCs held higher returning, lower 
risk portfolios (entrenchment effects at lower 
ownership levels). 
 
Brewer & Saidenberg (1996) 
 
Large publicly-traded thrifts in the 1980’s At a turning point of about 30% inside 
ownership, large thrifts had greater market risk 
(lower risk at lower ownership levels). 
 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman & Register 
 (1995, 1999) 
 
Thrift sample in the 1980’s to mid-1990’s 
 
  Similar results to Brewer, et al.  In the 1980’s 
risk was unprofitably taken, but profitably 
taken in the 1990’s. 
 
Sullivan & Spong (1998, 
 1999) 
Sample of small banks operating in the 10th 
Federal Reserve District in the 1990’s 
Small, closely held banks had greater risk 
when hired managers had significant 
ownership stakes. 
 
Bryd, Fraser, Lee &  
Williams (2000) 
Sample of Thrifts Operating in the Mid-1980’s 
 
Manager-owned thrifts had a lower probability 
of failure. 
 
Anderson & Fraser (2000) Sample of BHCs operating from 1987 to 1994. 
 
Positive relation between risk and managerial 
ownership in the 1980s; opposite in 1990’s. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables Used in Cost and Profit     
Functions (N=486) 
 
       
________________________________________________________________________  
       
Variable   Mean Std Min. Max.  
 
 
Variable Costs  $110.53  296.18  3.31 2,758.89   
(mils.)       
       
Variable Profits   55.74    44.96     -4.24   992.96                    
(mils.)   
 
    
% Total 
Revenues 
 
33.53% 
    
                       % Total  
                     Assets 
        
Home mortgages &  1,413.99  4,022.08 31.87 32,403.52  68.00% 
Mortgage-Backed      
Securities (mils.)      
       
Multifamily &     255.44  710.90 0.86 4,932.58  12.30% 
Nonresidential loans      
(mils.)       
       
Nonmortgage Loans     87.69 184.82 0.29 1,689.10  4.22% 
 (mils.)       
       
Cash & Other Security  196.09  400.36 4.18 2,374.01  9.43% 
Investments (mils.)      
       
Construction, Land,     52.56 107.86 0.04 1,079.43  2.53% 
Real Estate & Serv.      
Corporation Invs.     
(mils.)       
       
Price of Deposits %     6.08% 2.12% 2.54%     14.37%   
       
Price of Labor 
(thous) 
 $30.99  7.77 9.81 60.16   
       
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Cross-Sectional Analysis Variables      
               (N=486) 
  
       
CINEFF is a thrift's cost inefficiency score.   PINEFF is a thrift's profit inefficiency score.  
INSIDE is the percentage of stock held by officers and directors.    
OUTSIDE is the percentage of stock held by institutional investors.   
SIZE is the asset size in millions.  UNEMP is the state unemployment rate.   
MKBK is the market to book value of equity. 
ROA is net income to assets. 
PEER is a safety ranking from 0 to 99. 
CAPRATIO is tangible equity to assets.   
    
          
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
SYMBOL  MEAN  STD  MIN  MAX 
         
CINEFF  0.112  0.063  0.021  0.559 
         
PINEFF  0.356  0.297  0.034  2.753 
         
INSIDE  17.958%  13.924%  0.260%  72.700% 
         
OUTSIDE  16.922%  18.756%  0.000%  91.100% 
         
SIZE (mils.)  2,079.408  5,353.498  68.645  39,697.36 
         
UNEMP  6.145%  1.485%  2.200%  11.300% 
         
MKBK  0.838  0.403  0.083  2.207 
         
ROA %  .528  .997    -6.330  2.930 
         
PEER  54.395  26.924  0.000  99.000 
         
CAPRATIO %  7.296  3.061  .295  21.327 
         
____________________________________________________________________________
 1
 
Table 4: Results on Cost Inefficiency (CINEFF) and Profit Inefficiency (PINEFF)  
       
INSIDE is the percentage of stock held by officers and directors.    
INSIDESQ is the square of INSIDE.  OUTSIDE is the percentage of institutional investor ownership. 
LOGSIZE is the log of the assets in millions.  UNEMP is the state unemployment rate.  
MKBK is the market to book value of equity.  YEAR2…6 are year dummy variables.  
Wald Chi Square is a test of whether the independent variables are jointly different from zero. 
 
  Results on CINEFF   Results on PINEFF 
      Coeff.    T-stat        Coeff.       T-stat 
       
Constant  0.02547    1.250  .04741  .468 
         
INSIDE  0.00265  3.644***  .00961  2.342** 
         
INSIDESQ  -0.00004  -3.625***  -.00012  -2.158** 
         
OUTSIDE  0.00005    0.206  -.00236    -1.558 
         
LOGSIZE  0.00631    1.883*  .05968   3.036***
         
UNEMP  0.00322     1.702*  -.00523     -.588 
         
MKBK  0.01225  1.241  -.07055   -1.778* 
         
YEAR2  -.00368      -.368  -.00945    -.165 
         
YEAR3  -.00895  -.864  -.03766    -.709 
         
YEAR4  -.02047  -1.996*  -.09735   -1.831* 
         
YEAR5  -.02534  -2.294**  -.11719   -2.087** 
         
YEAR6  -.0321  -2.785***  -.0894   -1.548 
         
Turning         
Point INSIDE  33.125%    40.042%  
         
Wald         
Chi 
Square 
  27.226***    42.868***  
         
No. of Observations  486    486  
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.     
**  Significant at the 0.05 level.     
*   Significant at the 0.10 level.     
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Table 5: Results on Return on Assets (ROA)     
    
 
INSIDE is the percentage of stock held by officers and directors. 
   
INSIDESQ is the square of INSIDE.  OUTSIDE is the percentage of institutional investor ownership. 
LOGSIZE is the log of the assets in millions.  UNEMP is the state unemployment rate.  
MKBK is the market to book value of equity.  YEAR2…6 are year dummy variables.  
Wald Chi Square is a test of whether the independent variables are jointly different from zero. 
  
       
              Results on ROA     
     
                         
    Coeff.     T-stat  
           
Constant    .00960   4.191***  
         
INSIDE    .00007   2.515***  
         
OUTSIDE    .00014   4.201***  
         
LOGSIZE    -.00243   -5.492***  
         
UNEMP    -.00020      -.696  
         
MKBK    .01060     6.797***  
         
YEAR2    -.00120     -.843  
         
YEAR3    .00070      .487  
         
YEAR4    .00156    1.175  
         
YEAR5    .00048      .272  
         
YEAR6    -.00053     -.421  
         
Turning    None     
Point Inside        
        
Wald Chi Square                          112.252*** 
        
 
No. of Observations 
  
 
   
 
 
 486 
  
         
        
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.       
**  Significant at the 0.05 level.       
*   Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
      
   
 3
 
 Table  6: Empirical Results on Capital to Assets Ratio (CAPRATIO) and Peer Rankings (PEER) 
            
       
INSIDE is the percentage of stock held by officers and directors.    
INSIDESQ is the square of INSIDE.  OUTSIDE is the percentage of institutional investor ownership. 
LOGSIZE is the log of the assets in millions.  UNEMP is the state unemployment rate.  
MKBK is the market to book value of equity.  YEAR2…6 are year dummy variables.  
Wald Chi Square is a test of whether the independent variables are jointly different from zero. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
       
  Results on CAPRATIO    Results on PEER   
 Coeff.    T-stat           Coeff.   T-stat    
          
Constant  15.4140 14.590***  80.4700 10.720***   
         
INSIDE  -  .05909 -2.201**     .1396 1.828*   
         
INSIDESQ    .00072 1.925*      
         
OUTSIDE    .06614   6.005***     .7560  8.784***   
         
LOGSIZE   -1.6443 -10.830***  -6.8363  -6.201***   
         
UNEMP   .0931    1.164  -1.2833   -1.760*   
         
MKBK    1.8092  4.592***    31.0040   8.639***   
         
YEAR2   .0066 .016  -3.0770    -.980   
         
YEAR3  -.1772    -.388   -11.0170 -3.180***   
         
YEAR4  -.2284    -.433   -25.7300 -6.226***   
         
YEAR5  .3630 .737   -27.5780 -6.671***   
         
YEAR6  .1273 .258   -23.6180 -6.535***   
         
Turning         
Point INSIDE   41.035%                      None 
         
Wald         
Chi Square    
169.076*** 
  
 
 
282.808*** 
  
         
         
No. of Observations      486   486    
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.    
**  Significant at the 0.05 level.    
*   Significant at the 0.10 level.    
 
